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Abstract
In 2002, the European Union (EU) introduced the ePrivacy Directive
to regulate the usage of online tracking technologies. Its aim is to make
tracking mechanisms explicit while increasing privacy awareness in users.
It mandates websites to ask for explicit consent before using any kind of
profiling methodology, e.g., cookies. Starting from 2013 the Directive is
mandatory, and now most of European websites embed a “Cookie Bar”
to explicitly ask user’s consent.
To the best of our knowledge, no study focused in checking whether
a website respects the Directive. For this, we engineer CookieCheck, a
simple tool that makes this check automatic. We use it to run a measure-
ment campaign on more than 35, 000 websites. Results depict a dramatic
picture: 65% of websites do not respect the Directive and install tracking
cookies before the user is even offered the accept button.
In few words, we testify the failure of the ePrivacy Directive. Among
motivations, we identify the absence of rules enabling systematic auditing
procedures, the lack of tools to verify its implementation by the deputed
agencies, and the technical difficulties of webmasters in implementing it.
1 Introduction
When browsing the web, users encounter the so-called “trackers”. They build
their business on the massive collection and brokerage of personal data, and
severely threaten users’ privacy [16, 25]. To regulate the usage of tracking
technologies in the web, the EU Commission published in 2002 the ePrivacy
Directive, popularly known as the “Cookie Law”. It is one of the most strict
regulations on the usage of online tracking mechanisms [6, 7, 8]. Article 5
requires websites to ask “prior informed consent for storage or for access to
information stored on a user’s terminal equipment”. In other words, a website
must ask the visitor if she authorizes the usage of cookies and similar tracking
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mechanisms (e.g., web beacons, Flash cookies, etc.) before delivering and in-
stalling them. Each EU member state has adopted the Directive starting from
2013. Since then, its effect has become evident to end users because of the
presence of a “Cookie Bar” on most of websites (even if outside EU).
Despite the Directive has been in force for more than three years, there is
no study reporting how it is actually implemented and to what extent. In fact,
to the best of our knowledge, there exists no tool to automatically check if a
website respects the Directive. In this paper, we present CookieCheck [1], a
simple tool we engineer to automatically perform this check. Given a website,
CookieCheck visits it as a “new user”, and analyses cookies installed on the
client browser. If any of them is classified as profiling, CookieCheck tags the
website as not compliant with the Directive.
We use CookieCheck for a large measurement campaign involving websites
from 25 countries and 25 categories. Results are discouraging: The large ma-
jority (65%) of European websites violates the ePrivacy Directive, with some
categories (e.g., “News and Media”) where violations top to 92%. Funnily, Adult
sites come second in respecting it, after Law and Government sites.
Since each EU state has adopted a custom version of the ePrivacy Directive,
we further check if users from countries with strictest (e.g., Italy) or not up-to-
date (e.g., Germany) regulations get different protection from online tracking.
Results show marginal changes. In a similar way, changing browser, or consid-
ering mobile/desktop devices has little impact on results. In short, the ePrivacy
Directive is regularly violated.
The Directive has been criticized as a case of regulatory failure: it impairs
user browsing experience, and it is ineffective in increasing the awareness about
online tracking [17, 20, 24, 12]. Here, we show that the Directive is a failure from
the enforcement perspective too. As possible causes, we identify the fact that
the Directive deputizes each member state to monitor its enforcement without
sketching standardized auditing procedures, as well as the technical difficulties
for webmasters at monitoring the activity of third parties embedded in websites
(see Sec. 7 for a thorough discussion).
We strongly believe our results can be useful for both researchers and poli-
cymakers in the debate on how to regulate and enforce privacy policies on the
web.
2 Background
In this section we first describe the cookie technology in the context of online
tracking. Then, we describe the regulatory frameworks available in different
countries to govern the usage of cookies.
2.1 Cookies as tracking technology
Web services use cookies to store user information directly in the browsers. Each
time the browser sends a request to a server, it can attach a cookie installed dur-
2
ing previous communications, so that the status of the transaction is preserved
over time.
When loading a web page the user’s browser generally contacts different
servers to fetch all page objects. Some of these are first-party, i.e., belonging
to the same domain of the website, and some are third-party, i.e., belonging
to different domains, e.g., Content Delivery Networks (CDN), advertisement
platforms, etc. Cookies are installed on a per-domain basis. Therefore, first-
party cookies can be installed by the website (the first party), whereas third-party
cookies can be installed by third-party servers.
Cookies expiration time makes them also different. Session cookies are tem-
porary, i.e., deleted when the user closes the browser or after a short period of
time. Persistent cookies contain an explicit expiration date and stay stored in
the browser for long periods of time.
Third-party persistent cookies are the most prominent means used by trackers
to reconstruct users’ browsing trajectories and compute per-user profiles which
are employed to, e.g., deliver personalized advertisement [14]. As these threaten
users’ privacy, policymakers undertook initiatives to regulate their usage.
In this paper we focus on cookies installed by trackers, that we refer as
profiling cookies. Our approach can be extended to more advanced tracking
techniques such as beacons, flash cookies, canvas, etc.
2.2 Regulatory frameworks for web privacy
There exists no comprehensive regulatory framework concerning web privacy,
and each country eventually provides its own – see [21] for an exhaustive com-
parison.
Some countries, e.g., Brazil, China and US, lack of a regulation concerning
users’ web privacy. Other countries, e.g., Australia, India and Russia, devel-
oped regulatory frameworks that are vague with no technical details. The most
comprehensive frameworks which aim at regulating personal data collection and
usage in the web are those provided by Canada, Switzerland and the EU. In
this paper we focus on the latter, being its framework the most prominent, and
involving a large number of countries.
The EU introduced the Data Protection Directive [6] in 1995. It provided a
definition for “personal data”, and delineated criteria of transparency, legitimate
purpose and proportionality. It did not address web tracking, since, at that
time, the web was at its birth. The Directive has been amended in 2002 [7]
and 2009 [8]. In the last version, it explicitly disciplines the use of any tracking
“devices” (e.g., cookies, supercookies, fingerprinting, etc.), and it is based on
the “explicit consent” principle. It states that the website must i) provide a
clear description of the entities wishing to install tracking devices, ii) install
them only after explicit consent is provided by the user, and iii) describe how
the gathered information will be used.
Opinion 04/2012 [11] explicitly considers cookies, and clarifies which kinds
are exempted from the requirement of explicit consent: session cookies, and
cookies that are essential to provide the service are exempted (e.g., to handle
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a cart in an e-commerce website). Prior consent is required for all others. The
document explicitly observes that third-party persistent cookies are typically not
essential and, thus, not exempted. This is the case of profiling cookies. Opinion
15/2011 [10] details the consent procedure, and mandates the websites to i) offer
the user a short resume of the privacy policy, ii) a link to page containing all
details, and iii) an interactive element to explicitly ask users’ consent to install
tracking devices. All this information is typically provided in a “Accept Cookie
Bar” offered the user the first time she visits the website.
All EU member states must transpose, and likely adapt, EU Directives into
their regulatory body. As such, EU countries has transposed the ePrivacy Direc-
tive in different ways. For instance, France and Italy fully adopted the ePrivacy
Directive, so that French and Italian websites must require user explicit consent
for cookies, except for those exempted. In Italy, websites not respecting the
ePrivacy Directive can be fined up to 120, 000 Euro. Differently, Germany has
not yet transposed the ePrivacy Directive to its regulatory body, with the result
that German websites can simply describe the privacy policy adopted, but they
are not subject to any fine for not asking explicit consent.
The ePrivacy Directive does not sketch procedures to guide the enforcement
of its principles, nor provides guidelines to perform proper audits.
3 Measurement Approach
Our analysis builds on automatic browsing of web pages. For this task, we
use two different tools: CookieCheck [1], a custom tool we engineer to provide
experiment parallelization, and WebPageTest [4] which enables higher config-
urability. Both take as input a set of web pages, and use a regular browser to
visit each. When the page is fully loaded (i.e., the OnLoad event is triggered)
or a 90s timeout elapses, they dump to file the HTTP Archive (HAR) [23], a
JSON-formatted structure that summarizes navigation data, and reports statis-
tics about services and exchanged objects. For each HTTP transaction, the
HAR logs the headers of the corresponding request/response. If not otherwise
specified, we take care of erasing the browser cache before each visit. No user
action is performed on the page. Hence, we emulate the behavior of a new user
accessing the web page for the first time, and not providing any consent to the
installation of tracking devices such as cookies.
To understand which web pages violate the ePrivacy Directive, we analyze
the installed cookies at the end of each visit. We first pick all HTTP responses
with Set-Cookie header.1 Next, we match the domain of the service installing
the cookie against a list of 1, 232 well-known web-tracker domains, that we
obtain from Better Privacy Tool [5]. Thus, we consider only profiling cookies,
i.e., third-party persistent cookies installed by trackers. For this, we pick those
having a lifetime greater than a 1 month (details about threshold setting are
provided in Sec. 5.1).
1The Set-Cookie header contains the cookie the server generates to install on the browser.
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At the end of this process, we tag web pages violating the ePrivacy Directive
as those installing at least one profiling cookie, i.e., (i) related to a web-tracking
service, and (ii) persistent. Our approach is conservative as it builds on sub-
set of well-known tracking services, and does not include, e.g., advertisements
platforms, CDNs, etc. Second, we focus only on cookies leaving out all other
tracking mechanisms.
4 Tools and measurement campaigns
We run two measurement campaigns. The first aims at checking the presence
of profiling cookies at scale. The second investigates how tracking cookies differ
depending on device, browser settings, country, and when consent has been
given.
To perform these campaigns, we profit from a Linux machine equipped with
an Intel R© Xeon CPU with 12 cores and 32GB RAM and connected to the
Internet through a 1Gb/s network. For the analysis of data we use a medium-
size Hadoop cluster running Apache Spark and Python, whose Cookie module
allows us to parse cookies.
4.1 Large scale measurement campaign
We rely on SimilarWeb [3], a web-site ranking service analogue to Alexa to
obtain per-country and per-category website ranks. We pick popular websites
in 21 EU member states, plus 4 extra-EU countries for a more comprehensive
comparison.2 We consider sites from 25 different categories. The list of countries
and categories can be deduced from Fig.2. For each country and category, we
pick the 100 most popular websites. In total, we consider 25 × 25 services,
corresponding to 36, 197 unique websites to visit as the lists partially overlap.
Performing measurements on such a wide number of websites is challenging
on several points. In particular, measurements must scale and be fast enough to
visit websites in a reasonably short amount of time, without sacrificing accuracy.
Hence, we build a custom web measurement tool, namely CookieCheck, based on
Google Chrome; its code can be downloaded at [2], and a working demonstrator
of the tool is available online [1]. CookieCheck runs in a Docker container that
provides a reliable and lightweight means to isolate multiple browser instances.
24 Docker containers run in parallel to speed up the visiting cycles. We repeat
each visit 5 times. In total we performed 180, 985 visits over a period of 15 days,
and collected HAR files, corresponding to 213GB of raw data. Less than 5% of
visits failed for timeout intervention, likely due to temporarily offline websites
or slow loading speed. In the remainder of the paper we refer to this dataset
with Large-DS.3
2SimilarWeb provides per-country ranks for 21 EU member states out of 28.
3Given its size, we share this dataset on demand.
5
4.2 Specific measurement campaigns
We launch additional measurement campaigns using a different web measure-
ment tool, WebPageTest from Google [4]. This tool offers a more flexible con-
figuration than CookieCheck, but it does not enable parallel testing, thus con-
siderably increasing the collection time. Hence, we employ WebPageTest to run
experiments on smaller sets of web pages. In particular, we focus on the the
100 most popular websites for France, Germany and Italy. In total we count
241 unique websites. We then visit each of them, changing the configuration of
the tool and mimicking different scenarios.
First, we evaluate the impact of providing consent to the installation of cook-
ies. To this end, we visit the homepage of each website in our list, and manually
give the consent to the usage of cookies whenever the Cookie Bar is present.
We save the resulting browsing profile, and visit the websites again using Web-
PageTest. This lets us verify whether websites actually install profiling cookies
only upon user consent is provided. We refer to this dataset as CookieOK-DS.
Second, we investigate whether the use of different browsers may affect the
number of installed cookies. For instance, mobile devices typically download
simpler pages with less objects. We run tests using all browsers available within
WebPageTest: Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox and Google Chrome. Thanks
to Google Chrome advanced features, we emulate mobile browsers by changing
both User-Agent and screen size; we consider an Android smartphone and
tablet of the Nexus series, and an Apple iPhone6 and iPad2. We call this
dataset Browser-DS.
Finally, we study if and how websites change behavior when accessed from
different countries. To comply with different local regulations, a website could
react differently and install different sets of cookies depending on the client
location (e.g, checking its IP address or language settings). To validate this
hypothesis we use HTTP-proxies to change the client IP address and the location
of the the client. For this experiment, we follow the same approach employed
in [19]. We use 8 proxies located in 8 different European countries, changing the
locale settings accordingly. In this case we use the desktop version of Google
Chrome. We refer to this dataset as Country-DS.
5 Results
Here, we first analyze cookie lifetime to define threshold for classifying profiling
cookies. Then we unveil their usage in Large-DS. Finally, we study the effect
on profiling cookies when providing consent, and changing browser or country.
5.1 Distinguishing profiling cookies
As described in Sec. 3, we consider as profiling a cookie installed by a tracking
service and exhibiting a lifetime larger than a given threshold. A similar ap-
proach was used by the authors of [14]. To define such threshold, we compute
6
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
10 s 1 h 1 d 1 m 1 y 10 y
C
D
F
Lifetime
Figure 1: Empirical distribution calculated over lifetimes of third-party cookies
in Large-DS.
the cumulative distribution of third-party persistent cookie lifetimes in Large-
DS. Fig. 1 shows results. It clearly shows typical values, e.g., 1 day, 1 month,
1 year, and up to 10 years. As shown, 80% of third-party cookies last 1 month
or more. By manually inspecting them, we observe they belong mostly to web
trackers and advertising services. Hence, to conservatively define profiling cook-
ies, we consider all cookies installed by well-known tracking services (as by the
Better Privacy Tool), whose expiration period is 1 month or higher.
5.2 Assessing ePrivacy Directive violations at scale
We leverage CookieCheck to uncover the usage of profiling cookies across web
pages for each country and category. For this, we use Fig. 2, where each cell
reports the fraction of websites whereby the server installed at least one profiling
cookie during any of the 5 visits. We remind that 100 websites are considered
for each cell. Each row refers to a country, and each column to a category.
At the end of each row we report the country-wise average fraction. Columns
report the category-wise average fraction for EU countries only, and are sorted
from the highest violator to the lowest.
Several observations hold. First, we notice that there exists no category
whose fraction is close to 0. On average 66% of websites violates the ePrivacy
Directive. Recalling that our measurement is a conservative estimation (we
neglect tracking mechanisms different from cookies), this fraction is startling.
Even the category with the lowest fraction of non-compliant websites – “Law and
Government” – shows 31% of websites that are not complaint with the Directive.
This is possibly due to the fact that these websites usually do not embed a
lot of advertisement since they do not build their business by selling online
ads. Yet, third-party persistent cookies are installed – possibly for analytics
services. Funnily, Adult websites come second in being the more respectful
of the Directive. They likely offer little (or specializes) ads, thus hosts fewer
trackers. On the opposite side, websites in “News and Media” are totally prone
to violate the ePrivacy Directive (92% of violations on average). This is no
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Figure 2: Per-country and per-category fractions of websites installing at least
one profiling cookie in Large-DS. At the end of each row (column) it is reported
the country-(category)wise average.
surprise as these websites typically hosts a lot of advertisers, and thus trackers.
If we consider per-country results, we observe that the picture is rather uni-
form, especially for EU member states. Values span from 60% (Slovakia) to 74%
(UK). Interestingly, the former has not yet transposed the ePrivacy Directive
to its regulation, while the latter did. Looking outside Europe, websites tend
to install more profiling cookies at the first visit, with Russian (86%) and US
(75%) websites being negative examples. This demonstrates the ePrivacy Direc-
tive is having some positive effect if compared to countries with no regulatory
frameworks. However, this effect is small and far to be sufficient.
To complement above results, we double check which trackers install cookies
on users’ browser without consent. Fig. 3 reports the pervasiveness of the most
prominent trackers that install cookies before getting user’s consent: Doubleclick
from Google is the most present (appearing in 12% of websites), followed by
Adnxs by AppNexus (in 11% of websites). The popularity of the trackers clearly
influences the probability of finding it.
In conclusion, there exist differences across website categories and coun-
tries, but a clear trend strongly emerges: 65% of European websites ignore the
ePrivacy Directive and let trackers install profiling cookies without any prior
consent.
5.3 Installed cookies upon consent
Websites that properly respect the Directive ask for consent by means of a
button embedded in a Cookie Bar. When clicked, the website refreshes (or
updates) the page to deliver new and enriched content with objects that trigger
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Figure 3: Pervasiveness of Top–20 verified trackers. Eleven are contained in
more than 5% of web sites.
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Figure 4: Per-website number of profiling cookies installed before and after
giving consent.
the installation of cookies.
We count the websites which implement this procedure, and thus do not
violate the ePrivacy Directive. We consider three countries, as reported in
Tab. 1. Surprisingly, we observe that 54% of websites in CookieOK-DS do not
even provide a Cookie Bar, but regularly set tracking cookies! In France and
Italy, 69 and 53 out of 100 websites embed a Cookie Bar, respectively. For
Germany, which has yet to transpose the Directive, only 31 websites do that.
Furthermore, the Cookie Bar consent button triggers a page refresh in only 14
cases for Italian websites, just in 2 cases for French, and in no cases for German.
We consider the same 241 website to count the number of profiling cookies
which are installed before and after we provide consent. We report results in
Fig. 4, where websites are sorted by the number of profiling cookies installed
before consent (green line). To this baseline we then sum new cookies installed
after consent has been given (red dots). As shown, only 43 websites do not
install profiling cookies before obtaining consent. All other websites, i.e., 80.5%
install profiling cookies before consent, and possibly install more after that.
9
Country Banner Banner and Refresh
France 69 2
Germany 31 0
Italy 53 14
Table 1: Number of websites showing the Cookie Bar, and refreshing the page
upon user consent.
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Figure 5: Number of profiling cookies set with different browsers.
5.4 Impact of device and location
We study Browser-DS dataset to check whether installed profiling cookies vary
when using different browsers, devices, or changing country where the client is
located.
Fig. 5 reports the number of installed profiling cookies when using different
browsers and devices, separately for Italian, French and German websites. Box
plots span from the 1st to the 3rd quartile, while whiskers report the 10th and
the 90th percentiles; black strokes represent the median. A quite large amount of
profiling cookies is installed independently on the kind of browser or device, and
the number only slightly decreases for mobiles. This is likely due to the simpler
pages served to mobile devices. Recall that Germany has not yet transposed
the ePrivacy Directive at the moment of writing. This is reflected in the results
with German websites installing more profiling cookies than French and Italian,
respectively.
Finally, when the Country-DS websites are visited from 9 European countries
(France, Italy, Germany, Finland, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden)
the number of profiling cookies does not change. Results are reported in Fig. 6
using boxplots, whose characteristics are the same as in the previous figure. We
conclude that websites do not adapt the set of profiling cookies to install if the
country of the visitor implements the Directive in a different way.
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Figure 6: Number of profiling cookies set when changing crawling location. No
significant difference is observed.
6 Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first technical work analyzing the
adoption of the ePrivacy Directive at scale. Only Leenes and Kosta addressed
the same problem [18]. They manually visited 100 Dutch websites and observed
that most do not respect the ePrivacy Directive. Similar observations emerged
as a side effect in one of our previous studies [15].
Related to this work, it worths mentioning the work from Englehardt et
al. [13]. They addressed the problem of characterizing online tracking on very
large number of websites. The dataset authors collect contains the same infor-
mation we build upon to understand if a website violates the ePrivacy Directive,
but they did not consider that the “first visit” may be different due to regula-
tions in place.
Some works studied the ePrivacy Directive from the legal perspective [17, 20].
All concluded that this is a case of regulatory failure. Koops [17] argues that the
Directive creates the illusion that individuals have control over their data, and
it is difficult for webmasters to respect it. Differently, Markou [20] pinpoints
that the cause of the failure lies in resistance of advertisement ecosystem and
in the lack of privacy awareness among users. Here, we quantify the failure by
showing technical evidences rather than legal arguments.
7 Discussion and conclusion
Despite being conservative, our results clearly uncover that the majority of
websites ignores the ePrivacy Directive, testifying its flop.
We identify 5 main reasons behind this:
i) the Directive does not offer guidelines to perform systematic auditing pro-
cedures with a coordinated supervision. Two official reports from independent
third parties [24, 12] confirm this. In particular, [12] emphasizes that enforce-
ment of rules is “insufficient and inconsistent”, as currently in charge of each
member state’s competent authorities which “tend to audit in cases where there
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is a specific risk or complaint by an individual. Ex-officio audits remain a mi-
nority.”
ii) The lack of automatic tools that can verify whether a website violates the
Directive makes it possibly complicated for the deputed agencies to plan sys-
tematic audits.
iii) The Directive does not delineate clear standardization procedures to uni-
form the composition of the Cookie Bar and the implementation of the cookie
consent acquisition. This lack complicates both being compliant with the Di-
rective as well as its enforcement.
iv) It is cumbersome for webmasters to fully support the Directive. Indeed,
it is hard to control the activity of third parties, especially in the complicated
ecosystem of advertisement and tracking platforms. Small websites cannot likely
afford the additional technical and monetary costs.
v) Despite users are becoming more and more conscious about their privacy be-
ing violated in the web, the overall consciousness level is still too low. Regulators
should complement the ePrivacy Directive with proper awareness campaigns
aiming at educating users about how their privacy is threaten under the surface
of the web. Regarding this, the Regulatory Fitness and Performance (REFIT),
the EU body in charge of verifying effectiveness of Directives, states the current
rules end being counter-productive as “the constant stream of cookie pop-up-
boxes that users are faced with completely eclipses the general goal of privacy
protection as the result is that users blindly accept cookies” [22].
EU is currently drafting a revision of the Directive [9]. It aims to confirm the
principles that govern the old one, but also to adapt them to new technologies
and scenarios. Unfortunately, it still neglects above issues.
We have introduced CookieCheck as a crude and simple tool to audit whether
a website violates the ePrivacy Directive. It is available online [1], along with
source code [2] and datasets collected for this study, so that it can be improved
to include further checks.
Considering the research and measurement community, we are among the
first to face the verification of privacy regulations. This is surprising, comparing
to the effort given by the community to design tools to gauge, e.g., censorship
and violations of network neutrality. We hope the effort in producing tools for
auditing privacy violations will increase and get momentum.
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